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ABSTRACT
Energy storage can be used for many applications in the Smart Grid such as energy arbitrage, peak
demand shaving, power factor correction, energy backup to name a few, and can play a major role at
increasing the capacity of power networks to host renewable energy sources. Often, storage control
algorithms will need to be tailored according to power networks billing structure, reliability restric-
tions, and other local power networks norms. In this paper we explore residential energy storage
applications in Uruguay, one of the global leaders in renewable energies, where new low-voltage con-
sumer contracts were recently introduced. Based on these billing mechanisms, we focus on energy
arbitrage and reactive energy compensation with the aim of minimizing the cost of consumption of an
end-user. Given that in the new contacts the buying and selling price of electricity are equal and that
reactive power compensation is primarily governed by the installed converter, the storage operation is
not sensitive to parameter uncertainties and, therefore, no lookahead is required for decision making.
A threshold-based hierarchical controller is proposed which decides on the optimal active energy for
arbitrage and uses the remaining converter capacity for reactive power compensation, which is shown
to increase end-user profit. Numerical results indicate that storage could be profitable, even consid-
ering battery degradation, under some but not all of the studied contracts. For the cases in which it
is not, we propose the best-suited contract. Results presented here can be naturally applied whenever
the tariff structure satisfies the hypothesis considered in this work.
1. Introduction
Electric power systems are undergoing major transfor-
mations because of changes in the generation mix, in the
structure of the network, and in the means and profiles of
electricity consumption. The increased share of intermittent
generation requires large amount of reserves and costly in-
frastructure expansions, while the electrification of energy
consumption will significantly distort the aggregate electric-
ity consumption profile. This is mainly due to EVs that con-
sume as much as the rest of the loads in a typical house-
hold over a small charging period [11]. The negative conse-
quences of such distributed energy resources can be avoided
by an adequate response from active energy participants with
flexible energy consumption and/or generation (prosumers).
In order to achieve such a response, incentives are provided
to interested participants, who receive economic rewards in
exchange of their flexibility services. Authors in [19] ob-
serve that with the growth of renewable share the need for
such responsive users is going to increase. This represents
an opportunity for energy participants to start providing ser-
vices to the grid. Energy storage devices such as batteries are
at the focal point of such applications, as these are gradually
becoming profitable thanks to increasing flexibility opportu-
nities and rewards and to continuous drop of their cost [14].
Authors in [23] present the economic analysis of storage
in Southern California Homes. They highlight that earlier
ORCID(s):
Net-Energy Metering or NEM policies allowed only excess
renewable generation to be supplied back to the grid. How-
ever, new NEM policy allows distributed generation along
with solar to participate in NEM making it more conducive
for consumers to invest in energy storage.
For low voltage consumers, performing energy arbitrage
is one of the prominent applications of storage devices. Op-
timizing storage for performing energy arbitrage is studied
in numerous works, some of which are [24], [26], [10]. In
[24], the authors propose an algorithm mixture of dynamic
programming and particle swarm optimization to schedule
a battery in presence of a wind turbine. The time-of-use or
ToU has 3 leaves and they manage to obtain a 5.6 % saving
in the energy bill each month. Authors in [26] use linear pro-
gramming for storage control under ToU pricing for PG&E
residential and consumers in San Francisco. Authors in [10]
present a convex optimization formulation for storage con-
trol for equal buying and selling rates of electricity. They
also present a case-study for several energy markets in the
USA and Europe and identify the storage financial potential
in those energy markets. It is identified that only arbitrage is
not financially viable due to high cost and limited life of the
battery.
Co-optimizing energy storage formultiple revenue streams
could drastically enhance the gains made by storage owners
[31], [28], [15]. Pioneering work on co-optimization, [31],
presents an application of batteries performing arbitrage and
frequency regulation for a New York ISO case-study. They
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show that storage batteries might not be profitable for a sin-
gle dedicated application due to its high cost. Authors in
[28] claim that combining several applications could lead to
greater gains compared to cumulative gains obtained by per-
forming few of the tasks at a time. This is essential, as hav-
ing one dedicated goal might maximize gains in that appli-
cation but might lead to unexpected penalties or undermine
other applications. For instance storage performing only en-
ergy arbitrage could increase the peak demand charge paid
by the consumer, in effect reducing the total gain made by
the storage owner [15]. A fine understanding of the billing
mechanism is essential to avoid incurring such a penalty.
Profitability is an essential question from a consumer
perspective, who needs to decide whether to invest in en-
ergy storage devices. The storage battery having a limited
operational and aging life [13], economic analysis should
consider the operational cycles in analyzing the gains made
by using energy storage. Authors in [2] observe that ig-
noring storage degradation could inflate the gains made by
operating the storage battery. They also highlight the im-
portance of forecasting parameters such as consumer load
and electricity price for maximizing prosumer gains. Au-
thors in [20] present a case-study for Madeira island power
network, where they explore residential storage applications
and their economic viability. They also provide recommen-
dation about the best-suited contract among 46 different op-
tions for low voltage consumers based on short-term and
long-term simulations of 1 day and 1 month respectively.
In [5], the authors assess the profitability of storage in On-
tario under various pricing schemes, without the possibility
to sell energy back to the grid, showing that for several cases
it cannot be achieved. Authors in [4] evaluate the feasibility
of energy arbitrage (without selling back to the grid) in Aus-
tralia using time of use pricing. For several batteries they
found the probability of earnings depending on battery size.
Profitability of storage devices is governed by grid norms
which represent the eagerness and needs of power networks
to incentivize consumers for installing energy storage. The
compensation mechanisms are also influenced by political
will, as electricity is not just any commodity in a market for
profit making but also a necessity in today’s world.
In this work, we consider storage control and applica-
tions for LV consumers in Uruguay, where new contracts
were proposed in early 2019, providing unique opportunities
for consumers to include storage to modify the consumption
profile seen by the utilitymeter. We present a co-optimization
formulation for the energy storage device performing arbi-
trage and power factor correction (PFC), considering storage
degradation. We find that some consumer contracts could
be profitable enough for consumers to invest on storage. In
[16] authors identify that when co-optimizing storage for ar-
bitrage and PFC, these objectives are largely decoupled as
arbitrage is governed by storage charge level while the reac-
tive power capability is constrained by instantaneous active
power and converter size. Furthermore, authors in [16] also
identify that lookahead for reactive power compensation is
not essential, allowing us to consider myopic reactive com-
pensation. For energy arbitrage, the control in the context of
LV electricity consumer in Uruguay is simplified as
- No uncertainty in electricity price: In Time-of-Use the
instants and levels of price variations are known a priori
thus no uncertainty in storage control due to electricity price.
This is an advantage over real real-time electricity pricing
schemes, where prices need to be forecasted.
-Netmetering - Compensation of excess generation based
on equal buying and selling price level: Electricity buying
price could vary over time, however, at every time instant
the buying price and selling price remain the same in mag-
nitude. For example, consider the buying price of electricity
between 9 am and 10 am is 0.05$/kWh; the consumer con-
sumes say 20 kWh, making the cost of consumption equal
to $ 1. In the same time period had the prosumer instead
of consuming generated 20 kWh of energy, he/she would
have received compensation of $ 1. Under such a compensa-
tion mechanism, the objective to minimize the cost of con-
sumption of the user which includes inelastic load, renew-
able generation, and storage output is equivalent to maxi-
mizing the profit made by only energy storage performing
arbitrage [10]. In other words, optimal storage control de-
cisions are independent of variations in inelastic load and
renewable generation at consumer end, which was also ob-
served in [33]. Refer to Appendix A for more details. Fig. 1
shows the effect of parameter uncertainty based on pricing
mechanism and compensation of excess consumer genera-
tion. Thus, storage active power can be operated based on
present thresholds which minimize the stress on the battery
as the optimal solution. Note that because of the above-
mentioned context, active power output of storage also does
not require lookahead. The proposed consumer contracts
make consumers completely immune to uncertainty in sys-
tem variables, furthermore, no lookahead of such parameters
are required. This should be very attractive for consumers as
storage operation in amore dynamicmarket could affect con-
sumer gains made by storage operation due to the real-time
variation of system parameters causing a loss of opportunity.
In [6] authors found that consumer gains can beup to 59%
lower for the stochastic case in comparison to the determin-
istic one. Furthermore, authors in [22, 29] propose storage
control for performing arbitrage, taking into consideration
parameter uncertainty in real time storage operation. These
control mechanisms are computationally intensive, however,
in our work we observe that energy storage operation be-
comes immune to parameter uncertainty due to pricing of
electricity and excess generation compensation.
The paper is organized in sections. Section 2 provides
a brief summary of the power system landscape in Uruguay.
Section 3 presents the new electricity consumer contracts ap-
plicable for low voltage consumers in Uruguay. Section 4
outlines the various applications energy storage can be used
for the consumer contracts detailed in the previous section.
Section 5 describes the storage control algorithm applicable
for different contracts. The proposed storage algorithm con-
siders storage ramping and capacity constraint, charging and
discharging efficiency losses. Section 6 presents the numer-
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Pricing Type Compensation Mechanism
Real-time 
electricity price 
(RTP)
Time-of-Use 
(ToU) 
electricity price
Equal buying 
and 
selling price
Unequal buying
 and 
selling price
Case 1: No Uncertainty
Preset thresholds for 
charging and discharging 
is optimal as 
storage performing arbitrage is 
not sensitive to uncertainty
Case 2: Storage performing 
arbitrage under this case have 
uncertainty due to electricity
 price variation over time
Case 3: Storage performing 
arbitrage under this case 
have uncertainty due to 
inealstic load and renewable 
generation variation over time
Case 4: Storage performing 
arbitrage under this case
  have uncertainty due to
electricity price, inealstic load 
and renewable generation 
variation over time
Case 1: ToU + Equal Buy & Sell
Case 2: RTP + Equal Buy & Sell
Case 3: ToU + Unequal Buy & Sell
Case 4: RTP + Unequal Buy & Sell
Figure 1: Conditions and effect of parameter uncertain under storage performing arbitrage; Consider the consumer have an inelastic
load, local renewable generation and storage. Under this setting storage operation is prone towards uncertainty depending on
pricing type and excess generation compensation mechanism [12].
ical results using the storage control algorithm. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2. Energy Landscape in Uruguay
Uruguay is a country with 3.5million inhabitants located
in the south of South America, that has become a world
leader in renewable energies. Historically, this small country
has relied upon hydro power, mainly from two dams: Salto
Grande (co-owned with Argentina in the Uruguay river) and
RioNegro, thermal power plants, and importing energy from
neighboring countries: Argentina and Brazil. As of today,
Uruguay has completely changed their energy mix, consum-
ing mostly from renewable resources and becoming a purely
exporting country. In the year 2017, only 1% of the energy
was produced from thermal power stations, while 65% cor-
responded to hydro generation, and the remaining 34% was
composed of a mix between biomass, wind and photovoltaic
energy. With more than 600 wind turbines in 2018 wind
power provided up to 49 % of the energy consumed, which
positions Uruguay as the second country in the world with
the highest share of wind power in their electricity mix, be-
hind Denmark.
The main actor in the energy sector is UTE, a public
company that acts as the only retailer, DSO and TSO, and it
is also one of the main producers of electricity. In a country
with a surface of 176,215 푘푚2, the distribution and trans-
mission lines span 84,245 km and 5561 km respectively as
of 2017. As a matter of comparison, France with 3.6 times
the extension of Uruguay, has 18.8 times more kilometers
of transmission lines [27]. Of the above mentioned mix,
the residential sector consumes approximately 3500 GWh
yearly, while big customers represent a load of 2000 GWh
and medium consumers account for 1500 kWh. The peak
power consumption registered in the years 2016 and 2017
was of 1964 MW and 1916 MW respectively and occurred
during the winter (mid July), while the yearly load factor was
of 64.3 %.
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Uruguay’s energy sector is still evolving towards a smarter
landscape. UTE has several demand response programs in
place. Among them, they offer time-of-use tariff to residen-
tial consumers, 60% price rebates for big consumers who
increase their demand during periods of renewable energy
surplus, and price rebates on efficient household appliances
such as class A water heater. Regarding distribution of resi-
dential clients among tariffs, 47 % of total clients subscribe
to a flat rate tariff while 53% use a more complex contract
such as time-of-use.
3. Electricity Consumer Contracts
Low Voltage (LV) electricity consumers can opt for new
billingmechanisms introduced byUTE in January 2019 [30],
leading residential consumers to choose among three differ-
ent consumer contracts. Next we describe the three contracts
denoted as C1, C2 and C3 in this document for easy referenc-
ing. They are structured with a variable fee that depends on
the amount or the time of active energy consumption, a part
that is proportional to the contracted peak power and a fixed
charge that is applied to all contracts every month, irrespec-
tive of their variable energy or power consumption. Further-
more, consumers pay a reactive energy charge. The details
of the contracts can be found Portal of Electricity operator
in Uruguay1. The electricity prices are listed in Uruguayan
peso2.
This section is divided into five sub-sections. In Sec-
tion 3.1 we list the fixed and variable active energy rates for
the different contracts. In Section 3.2 the peak contracted
power is given. Note that consumers need to select the peak
power contracts beforehand, as it determines the cabling and
metering requirements and therefore, do not have a flexibil-
ity in real-time to optimize. In turn, this will determine the
fixed costs incurred by the consumer. The billing of reac-
tive power under the three contracts are presented in Sec-
tion 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the total and variable cost of
electricity consumption. In this paper, we use the variable
component to minimize the cost of consumption of user us-
ing a battery. Consumers with distributed generation such as
rooftop solar generation can opt for net-metering inUruguay.
Section 3.5 presents the net-metering policies for different
consumer contracts.
3.1. Fixed and Active Energy Cost
Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 lists the fixed, power and
energy charges for contracts C1, C2 and C3. The fixed cost
for contract 퐶푖 is denoted as 퐶퐶푖fixed for 푖 ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Wealso present the active energy charge calculated under the
different contracts for consumers.
3.1.1. C1: Simple Residential Flat Rate
Simple residential contracts are applicable for consumers
with voltage level 230V and 400V and the contracted power
is less than or equal to 40 kW. The cost of active energy is
1https://tinyurl.com/y5ug28jh
21 Uruguayan Peso equals 0.031 USA Dollar on 21st Feb. 2019.
Table 1
C1: Simple Residential Rate
Category Price
Charge for energy consumption:
1 kWh to 100 kWh monthly 5.160 peso/kWh
101 kWh to 600 kWh monthly 6.470 peso/kWh
601 kWh onwards 8.065 peso/kWh
Charge for contracted power 61.6 peso/kW
Fixed monthly charge 198.9 peso
Table 2
C2: Two-level ToU Residential Rate
Category Price
Charge for energy consumption:
Peak hours: from 17:00 to 23:00 8.623 peso/kWh
Off-peak hours: 00:00 to 17:00 3.453 peso/kWh
and 23:00 to 24:00 hrs
Charge for contracted power 61.6 peso/kW
Fixed monthly charge 359.4 peso
given as:
퐶퐶1active = 휆fixed퐸푎, (1)
where퐸푎 denotes the active energy consumed and expressedin kWh and 휆fixed denotes the flat rate electricity cost underC1.
3.1.2. C2: Two level Time-of-Use (ToU) Rates
Two level ToU residential contracts are applicable for
consumers with voltage level 230V and 400V and the con-
tracted power greater than 3.3 kW and less than or equal to
40 kW. The cost of active energy is given as:
퐶퐶2active = 휆peak퐸
peak
푎 + 휆off-peak퐸
off-peak
푎 , (2)
where퐸peak푎 denotes the active energy consumed during peak
period over the month, 퐸off-peak푎 denotes the active energyconsumed during off-peak period over the month, and ex-
pressed in kWh and 휆peak denotes peak electricity cost, 휆off-peakdenotes off-peak electricity cost under C2 contract.
3.1.3. C3: Three-level ToU Rates
Three level ToU residential contracts are applicable for
consumers with voltage level 230V and 400V and the con-
tracted power greater than 3.7 kW and less than or equal to
40 kW. The cost of active energy is given as:
퐶퐶3active = 휆peak퐸
peak
푎 +휆mid-peak퐸
mid-peak
푎 +휆off-peak퐸
off-peak
푎 ,
(3)
where 퐸mid-peak푎 denotes the active energy consumed duringmid-peak period over the month and expressed in kWh and
휆mid-peak denotes mid-peak electricity cost under C3 con-tract.
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Table 3
C3: Three-level ToU Residential Rate
Category Price
Charge for energy consumption:
Peak hours: from 17:00 to 23:00 hrs 8.623 peso/kWh
Mid-peak hours: 07:00 to 17:00 4.676 peso/kWh
and 23:00 to 24:00 hrs
Off-peak hours: 00:00 to 7:00 hrs 1.803 peso/kWh
Charge for contracted power 61.6 peso/kW
Fixed monthly charge 359.4 peso
Table 4
Power Contracted: 1-phase LV consumers
Power levels
3.7 kW, 4.6 kW, 7.4 kW, 9.2 kW
Table 5
Power Contracted: 3-phase LV consumers
Power levels (kW)
12, 20, 25, 30, 35,
40 kW, 41 to 50 kW
3.2. Peak Power Contract for LV Consumers
For low voltage consumers in Uruguay should specify
the peak power contracted. This is essential as the utility
provides the connection and safety features based on the con-
tracted power.
Single phase consumers in LV network can select the
contracted power from following levels presented in Table 4.
Three phase consumers in LV network can select the con-
tracted power from following levels presented in Table 5.
Based on Table 4 and Table 5 consumers select their power
contract denoted as 푃contracted. The charge for power con-tracted for contract 푖 ∈ {1, 2, 3} is denoted as 퐶퐶푖power. Thecost of power contracted is given as:
퐶퐶푖power = 휆power푃contracted. (4)
The value of 휆power is listed in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3for contracts C1, C2 and C3 respectively. Note the peak
power charge is same for C1/C2/C3.
3.3. Billing of Reactive Energy
Traditionally, LV consumers were not obliged to regu-
late reactive power. There where many well thought reasons
why it made sense, we list a few below:
∙Majority of loads used by low voltage consumers consisted
of resistive loads, thus, the inherent power factor seen by the
grid used to be close to unity.
∙ Utility neither had the infrastructure nor the motivation for
making it obligatory for small LV consumers to comply re-
active power norms normally well-defined for commercial
establishments.
However, the reasons why utilities across the world do
not meter reactive power in LV networks is rapidly changing
due to some of the following reasons:
∙ Evolution of many new loads have significantly increased
the reactive power of the LV consumers. In absence of reg-
ulation utilities would have to face degradation of efficiency
of LV distribution network [7] and additional stress on dis-
tribution transformer.
∙Most countries have been promoting distributed generation
(DG) such as rooftop solar PV installations. These DGs op-
erate at close to unity power factor, implying that while an
important part of the active power is locally met by the DG,
all the reactive power is provided/absorbed by the grid [16].
Due the abovementioned transformation, the utilities are
designing penalties for consumers with a low power factor.
Uruguay is in the fore front globally in implementing reac-
tive power penalties and incentives for small LV consumers
to control their power factor.
Next we describe the mechanisms of charging for de-
graded power factor for each of the three consumer contracts.
3.3.1. Reactive power cost under C1
Consumers billed in accordance to C1, or simple resi-
dential contract, need to pay a penalty if the power factor
calculated for the month deteriorates below 0.92. The power
factor is calculated as a function of aggregate reactive power
(퐸푟) and active power (퐸푎) as follows
pfmonth = cos
(
arctan
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
))
. (5)
The cost or reactive power for contract C1 is given as
퐶퐶1reactive = 퐾fac × 퐸푟. (6)
Where 퐾fac is the coefficient of surcharge for reactive con-sumption and is governed by the following conditions:
퐾fac =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0, if 퐸푟퐸푎 ≤ 0.426,
0.4
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
− 0.426
)
, if 퐸푟퐸푎 ∈ (0.426, 0.7],
0.4
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
− 0.426
)
+ 0.6
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
− 0.7
)
, if 퐸푟퐸푎 > 0.7.
(7)
3.3.2. Reactive power cost under C2
Consumers billed in accordance to C2, or two-level ToU
residential contract, need to pay a penalty if the power fac-
tor calculated for the month deteriorates below 0.92. Con-
sumers under C2 are also provided incentives for caseswhere
the pfmonth exceeds 0.92. The coefficient of surcharge or con-sumption bonus for reactive consumption is governed by fol-
lowing conditions:
퐾fac =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
퐵
100
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
− 0.426
)
, if 퐸푟퐸푎 ≤ 0.7,
퐵
100
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
− 0.426
)
+ 100−퐵100
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
− 0.7
)
, if 퐸푟퐸푎 > 0.7,
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Kfac
 Er  / Ea
Slope, λ1Slope, - λ1
0.426- 0.426
Slope, - λ2 Slope,  λ2
- 0.7 0.7
Figure 2: Graphical representation of 퐾fac for C1 with respect
to the PF; where 휆1 = 0.4 and 휆2 = 1.
Kfac
 Er  / Ea
Slope, λ1Slope, - λ1
0.426- 0.426
Slope, - λ2 Slope,  λ2
- 0.7 0.7
Figure 3: Graphical representation of 퐾fac for C2 with respect
to the PF; where 휆1 =
퐵
100
and 휆2 = 1.
(8)
where the value of B is 36 or 34 depending on the contract.
For consumers under C2, the coefficient퐾fac acts as penalty
for case where 퐸푟퐸푎 > 0.426. However, if
퐸푟
퐸푎
≤ 0.426 then it
provides incentives for the consumer as the cost of reactive
power would be negative. Coefficient 퐾fac is applied to thetotal active energy consumed during the peak period over the
whole month. The total active energy is denoted as
퐸푎 = 퐸
off-peak
푎 + 퐸
peak
푎 , (9)
The cost or reactive power for contract C2 is given as
퐶퐶2reactive = 퐾fac × 퐸
peak
푎 . (10)
3.3.3. Reactive power cost under C3
The power factor applied for C3 consumers is given as
pf+month = cos
(
arctan
(퐸푟푄1
퐸푎+
))
, (11)
where퐸푟푄1 is the absolute value of reactive energy in Quad-rant 1 over a month expressed in kVAR and 퐸푎+ denotesthe absolute value of active energy in the month expressed
Table 6
Value of B under C3
Voltage level Value of B
230 to 400 V 23
6.4 - 12 - 22 kV 18
31.5 kV 12
in units kWh. Consumers billed in accordance to C3, or
three level ToU residential contract, need to pay a penalty
if the power factor, calculated with aggregate reactive power
(퐸푟푄1) and active power (퐸푎+), calculated for the month de-teriorates below 0.92. Similar to C2, Consumers under C3
are also provided incentives for cases where the pf+month ex-ceeds 0.92.
The coefficient of surcharge or consumption bonus for
reactive consumption is governed by following conditions:
퐾fac =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
퐴
100
(퐸푟푄1
퐸푎+
− 0.426
)
, if 퐸푟푄1퐸푎+ ≤ 0.7,
퐴
100
(퐸푟푄1
퐸푎+
− 0.426
)
+ 100−퐵100 (
퐸푟푄1
퐸푎+
− 0.7), if 퐸푟푄1퐸푎+ > 0.7,
(12)
where the value of B depends on supply voltage listed in
Table 6. Coefficient퐾fac is applied to the total active energyconsumed during the peak period over thewholemonth. The
total active energy is denoted as
퐸푎+ = 퐸
off peak
푎+ + 퐸
mid peak
푎+ + 퐸
peak
푎+ , (13)
where 퐸off peak푎+ denotes the total energy consumed during
off-peak hours over the month, 퐸mid peak푎+ denotes the totalenergy consumed duringmid-peak hours over the month and
퐸peak푎+ denotes the total energy consumed during peak hoursover the month. The cost or reactive power for contract C3
is given as
퐶퐶3reactive = 퐾fac × 퐸푎+. (14)
3.4. Cost of Consumption
The cost of electricity consists of four components:
(1.) Fixed electricity cost: depending on the contract
type, consumers are charged a fixed cost which is indepen-
dent of the consumed electricity,
(2.) Power contracted cost: the consumer specifies the
peak power level before the utility provides a connection.
From the utility perspectives this contract determines the
protection settings, fuse settings, cable ratings, meter type
etc.
(3.) Active energy cost: The cost of consuming active
energy is decided by the contract type.
(4.) Reactive energy cost: This component of electricity
cost is decided by the power factor, voltage level, total active
energy consumed and contract type.
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Kfac
 ErQ1  / Ea+
Slope, λ1Slope, - λ1
0.426- 0.426
Slope, - λ2 Slope,  λ2
- 0.7 0.7
Figure 4: Graphical representation of 퐾fac for C3 with respect
to the PF; where 휆1 =
퐴
100
and 휆2 = 1.
Table 7
Variable cost component based on contract type
Contract 퐶퐶푖variable
C1 휆fixed퐸푎 +퐾fac × 퐸푟
C2 휆peak퐸peak푎 + 휆off-peak퐸
off-peak
푎 +
퐾fac × 퐸peak푎
C3 휆peak퐸peak푎 + 휆mid-peak퐸
mid-peak
푎 +
휆off-peak퐸off-peak푎 +퐾fac × 퐸
peak
푎+
Therefore, the total cost of consumption under contract
퐶푖 is given as
퐶퐶푖Total = 퐶
퐶푖
fixed + 퐶
퐶푖
power + 퐶
퐶푖
active + 퐶
퐶푖
reactive. (15)
The variable component of the cost would consists of the
cost of active and reactive power given as
퐶퐶푖variable = 퐶
퐶푖
active + 퐶
퐶푖
reactive. (16)
The variable component of electricity price could only
be reduced if the electricity consumer optimizes their con-
sumption locally using load flexibility and/or energy storage.
The cost component 퐶퐶푖fixed + 퐶퐶푖power have no degree of free-dom and therefore, cannot be reduced.
3.5. Net-Metering in Uruguay
Net-energy metering (NEM) for small wind power, so-
lar, biomass and mini-hydro systems is allowed since 2010
by Decree 173/0103 on micro-generation. The government-
owned national electric company, UTE4, is mandated to buy
at retail price all the excess electricity produced by consumers
for a period of ten years [1]. Generated electricity must be
low-voltage and the maximum power of installations is the
lower between 6 kW and the peak power contracted by con-
sumer, although higher power is possible with additional au-
3http://tinyurl.com/y2ccr2o2
4https://portal.ute.com.uy/
  
Buying  or Selling Price
00:00 00:0012:00
5.160 peso/kWh
Contract C1
Figure 5: Buying and selling price of electricity over a day
under contract C1 with NEM
  
Buying or Selling Price                          
00:00 17:00
3.453 peso/kWh
Contract C2
8.623 peso/kWh
23:00
Figure 6: Buying and selling price of electricity over a day
under contract C2 with NEM
  
Buying or Selling Price                                    
00:00 17:00
1.803 peso/kWh
Contract C3
8.623 peso/kWh
23:007:00
4.676 peso/kWh
Figure 7: Buying and selling price of electricity over a day
under contract C3 with NEM
thorization before installation5. The buying and selling elec-
tricity prices for LV consumers in Uruguay under contracts
C1, C2 and C3 are depicted in Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 which
shows that buy and sell price have the same level. Note that
consumer needs to opt for NEM separately by notifying the
utility which may require the installation of different hard-
ware.
In this paper we use net-metering for contracts C2 and
C3. The rationale behind not opting for net-metering for
contract C1 is described in Section 4.2.1.
4. Storage for LV Prosumers in Uruguay
The system considered in this work consists of an elec-
tricity consumer with inelastic demand, renewable genera-
tion (rooftop solar) and energy storage. The battery will
provide flexibility to deviate consumption in order to make
gains by performing arbitrage and provide reactive energy
compensation. The system is shown in Fig. 8. The energy
storage interfaced via a converter provides flexibility to the
consumer to modify the active and reactive power seen by
the grid. Energy storage with converter can act as source
and/or sink of active and reactive power. Opportunities for
prosumers with storage in Uruguay are:
Arbitrage: the ToU cost structure makes the selection
5https://tinyurl.com/y2gydsu7
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Energy Meter Power Grid 
Residential Customer 
Battery 
Rooftop Solar PV 
Total energy demand met by the Grid and/or  
Rooftop Solar PV and/or Battery 
Figure 8: System Considered
of arbitrage decisions fairly simple for storage owners. Fur-
thermore, since under Net-metering policies in Uruguay, the
buy and sell price is equal for each time instant, shown in
Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, this implies that the control energy
storage becomes independent of the inelastic load and solar
generation.
From the structure of ToU prices, clearly the storage needs
to charge during the off-peak period and discharge during the
peak period. Storage remains idle during mid-peak periods
except for very slow ramping batteries which could not be
completely charged in off-peak duration or discharged com-
pletely during peak period duration.
Avoiding power factor penalty: previouslywe described
the billing mechanism for reactive power for LV consumers
in Section 3.3. The thresholds indicate that as power factor
(PF) seen by the grid deteriorates the cost of consumption in-
creases in proportion to peak energy consumed; this penalty
for low PF could be avoided by maintaining the PF locally.
Energy storage interfaced via a converter could be used for
PF improvement locally.
Maintaining a high PF so as the consumer receives ad-
ditional rebate on electricity consumption cost. Note that
the consumers maintaining a unity PF could reduce the ac-
tive power cost under C2 by almost 13.6% of the cost energy
consumed under the peak period of ToU. For contract C3,
the cost of consumption could be reduced by utmost 9.8% of
the cost of energy consumed during peak period. However,
for C1, there is no additional incentive for consumers im-
proving the PF above 0.92. Users opting for C1 could make
profit by reactive power compensation if the PF without any
such correction is lower than 0.92.
4.1. Notation and Battery Model
The inelastic load for time 푖 is denoted as 푑푖. The dis-tributed generation for time 푖 is denoted as 푟푖. The total ac-tive load seen by the energy meter without storage is denoted
as 푃 푖 = 푑푖 − 푟푖. The reactive power at time 푖 without stor-age is denoted as 푄푖. We denote the battery using ramping
and capacity constraint, considering charging and discharg-
ing efficiency. The ramping constraint is denoted as
훿푖 ∈ [훿min, 훿max], (17)
where 훿min denotes minimum ramping rate or the maximumdischarge rate and 훿max denotes the maximum charge rate inunits of watts (i.e. power).
The instantaneous battery capacity is denoted as 푏푖 fortime instant 푖. The battery capacity should satisfy the capac-
ity constraint given as
푏푖 ∈ [푏min, 푏max], (18)
where 푏min and 푏max denotes the minimum and maximumbattery capacity. The instantaneous battery evolution with
time depends the ramp rate of the battery and the battery
capacity in the previous time instant and is given as
푏푖 = 푏푖−1 + 푥푖, (19)
where 푥푖 = 훿푖ℎ denotes the change in charge level of thebattery. ℎ denotes the sampling time. The state-of-charge
(SoC) of the battery is defined as
SoC푖 =
푏푖
푏rated
, (20)
where 푏rated is the rated battery capacity. For LiIon batteryhealth consideration, it should not be over-charged or over-
discharged beyond a certain level [3], we define SoCmin =
푏min∕푏rated and SoCmax = 푏max∕푏rated.We define two more variables. The time required for the
energy storage to completely discharge from 푏max to 푏min atthe maximum discharge rate is given as
푇푑푖푠 =
푏max − 푏min|훿min| . (21)
The time required for the energy storage to completely
charge from 푏min to 푏max at the maximum charge rate is givenas
푇푐ℎ =
푏max − 푏min
훿max
. (22)
The active power output of the battery is denoted as
푃 푖퐵 =
[푥푖]+
ℎ 휂푐ℎ
−
[푥푖]−휂푑푖푠
ℎ
, (23)
where 휂푐ℎ and 휂푑푖푠 denotes charging and discharging effi-ciency of the battery and lies in the range (0, 1]. The active
power ramp rate constraint is given as
푃 푖퐵 ∈ [푃
min
퐵 , 푃
max
퐵 ] with 푃min퐵 =훿min휂푑푖푠, 푃max퐵 =
훿max
휂푐ℎ(24)
Though the battery charge level is not affected by the re-
active power output푄푖퐵 of the connected inverter, the amountof active power supplied or consumed is dependent upon it
due to the line current limitations [21]. The converter rating
is given by maximum apparent power supplied/consumed
denoted as 푆max퐵 . The instantaneous apparent power of bat-tery 푆 푖퐵 should satisfy
(푆max퐵 )
2 ≥ (푃 푖퐵)2 + (푄푖퐵)2, (25)
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Table 8
Storage Operation under C1 without NEM
Min Load Max Load Installed Storage
without solar without solar Solar kWp Role
퐿min 퐿max below 퐿min No storage active energy management required
퐿min 퐿max between 퐿min and 퐿max Storage might increases self-consumption
퐿min 퐿max above 퐿max Storage increases self-consumption
The PF seen by the grid is the ratio of real power supplied
or extracted by the grid over the apparent power seen by the
grid. In the absence of storage it is given by
pf푖bc = 푃
푖√
푃 푖2 +푄푖2
. (26)
Observe that pfbc degrades as 푟푖 and 푄푖 increases in magni-tude. In the presence of storage, PF takes the form
푝푓 푖c =
푃 푖 + 푃 푖퐵√
(푃 푖 + 푃 푖퐵)2 + (푄푖 +푄
푖
퐵)2
. (27)
where total active power is denoted as 푃 푖푇 = 푃 푖 + 푃 푖퐵 andtotal reactive power is given as 푄푖푇 = 푄푖 +푄푖퐵 .
Stress on battery: Authors in [25, 8] identify that the in-
ternal storage losses depends square of the current supplied
by the battery. Thus the storage operational profile which
reduces the sum of square of currents over the time horizon
would minimize the losses and thus we consider reduce the
stress on the battery.
4.2. Active Power Management
Energy storage active power could serve two purposes:
(1.) increase self-consumption of locally generated energy
under the absence of NEM and (2.) perform arbitrage under
ToU electricity pricing.
4.2.1. Under Contract C1
Energy price is fixed for the day and, therefore, no arbi-
trage is possible. Under fixed electricity price storage could
maximize self-consumption locally in absence ofNEM.How-
ever, self-consumption could only be increased for caseswhere
the instantaneous generation is more than the instantaneous
load [20].
Table 8 lists the effect on self-consumption with the size
of installed solar in absence of net-metering, which implies
consumers have no incentive to supply power back to the grid
and therefore, would attempt to increase the self-consumption
as much as possible [20]. In Table 8 퐿min, 퐿max denotes theminimum and maximum load without solar, 0 ≤ 퐿min ≤
퐿max. For case where installed solar is comparable or largerthan maximum load without solar generation, storage sub-
stantially contributes in increasing self-consumption.
Theorem 4.1. For arbitrage to be profitable following con-
dition should be valid:
푝푗푠휂dis >
푝푖푏
휂ch
,
where 푝푗푠 denotes the selling price at time instant 푗 and 푝푖푏
denotes the buying price at time instant 푖, such that 푗 > 푖
and 푗, 푖 ∈ {1, 2, , ..., 푁}. Here 푁 denotes the number of
time instants in the horizon.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is provided in Appendix B.
Performing arbitrage with contract C1 with NEM will
not be profitable as Theorem 4.1 is not valid, since 푝푗푠 =
푝푖푏 ∀푗, 푖 and 휂ch, 휂dis < 1. In this work we explore the usageof energy storage for different contracts. Optimizing the en-
ergy storage is essential pertaining to its high cost. In context
of C1 storage can only be used either for backing up excess
generation and/or for peak demand shaving. Backing up en-
ergy will require no look-ahead and greedy behavior leads to
optimality [20]. The optimal solution in such a case is gov-
erned by the sign of 푃 푖 and is given as
∙ If 푃 푖 ≥ 0 then battery should discharge such that 푃 푖퐵 =
max
{
−푃 푖, 훿minℎ휂푑푖푠, (푏푖−1 − 푏max)휂푑푖푠
},
∙ If 푧푖 < 0 then battery should charge such that 푃 푖퐵 = min{
−푃 푖, 훿maxℎ∕휂푐ℎ, 푏푖−1 − 푏min∕휂푐ℎ
}.
4.2.2. With C2 or C3 with NEM
Optimal energy storage arbitrage under net-energy me-
tering is introduced in [9]. The proposed algorithm pro-
vides a unique solution. However, performing arbitrage un-
der time-of-use setting often has infinite possible optimal so-
lutions as many different charging and discharging trajecto-
ries would lead to optimal arbitrage gains.
A battery performing arbitrage under contracts C2 and
C3 in Uruguay will perform at maximum 1 cycle over a day
of depth-of discharge equal to SoCmax − SoCmin. Considerthe the battery capacity denoted as 푏rated could charge fromSoCmin to SoCmax at off-peak period then the storage buyingcost including charging losses would be 휆off-peak(SoCmax −SoCmin)푏rated∕휂ch. Similarly, for battery discharging fromSoCmax to SoCmin during peak period of ToU price, 휆peak,would provide a revenue of 휆peak(SoCmax−SoCmin)푏rated휂dis.The storage owner profit is the difference of the revenuemade
by discharging and cost incurred during charging, shown as
퐺arb = (SoCmax−SoCmin)푏rated
{
휆peak휂dis−휆off-peak∕휂ch
}
.
(28)
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Storage ramp rate selection under ToU is governed by
the relationship between (a.) 푇off-peak and 푇ch and (b.) 푇peakand 푇dis. For contract C2 we define 푇off-peak as the period of17 hours (from 00:00 to 17:00) and 푇peak as the period of 6hours (from 17:00 to 23:00). Refer to Fig. 6.
For contract C3 we define 푇off-peak as the period of 7hours (from 00:00 to 7:00) and 푇peak as the period of 6 hours(from 17:00 to 23:00). Refer to Fig. 7.
Based on relationship between (a.) 푇off-peak and 푇ch and(b.) 푇peak and 푇dis following cases are proposed for storageperforming arbitrage under ToU prices:
Case 1: 푇off-peak > 푇ch and 푇peak > 푇dis: For this casethe battery can be fully charged during off-peak period and
fully discharged during peak period. In this case the ramp
rate of the battery should be selected so the stress on battery
(which is proportional to square of ramp rate) is minimized.
The storage ramp rate is as follows:
• If {푝푖푒푙푒푐 = 휆peak} then discharge at 훿∗peak = max((푏min−
푏max)∕푇peak, (푏min − 푏푖−1)∕ℎ, 훿min),
• If {푝푖푒푙푒푐 = 휆off-peak} then charge at 훿∗off-peak = min((푏max−
푏min)∕푇off-peak, (푏max − 푏푖−1)∕ℎ, 훿max),
Case 2: 푇off-peak > 푇ch and 푇peak < 푇dis: Battery shouldonly be charged to a level which could be discharged com-
pletely during peak period. The storage ramp rate is as fol-
lows:
• If {푝푖푒푙푒푐 = 휆peak} then discharge at 훿∗peak = 훿min,
• If {푝푖푒푙푒푐 = 휆off-peak} then charge at 훿∗off-peak = min((푏max−
푏min)∕푇off-peak, (푏max − 푏푖−1)∕ℎ, 훿max),
Case 3: 푇off-peak < 푇ch and 푇peak > 푇dis: For this casebattery cannot be charged completely from 푏min to 푏max within
푇off-peak time period. The storage ramp rate is as follows:
• If {푝푖푒푙푒푐 = 휆peak} then discharge at 훿∗peak = max((푏min−
푏max)∕푇peak, (푏min − 푏푖−1)∕ℎ, 훿min),
• If {푝푖푒푙푒푐 = 휆off-peak} then charge at 훿∗off-peak = 훿max,
Case 4: 푇off-peak < 푇ch and 푇peak < 푇dis: For this casethe storage ramp rate is given by conditions as follows:
• If {푝푖푒푙푒푐 = 휆peak} then discharge at 훿∗peak = 훿min,
• If {푝푖푒푙푒푐 = 휆off-peak} then charge at 훿∗off-peak = 훿max,
It is clear that for Case 1 described above, the battery
will perform 1 cycle per day at a Depth-of-Discharge equal
to DoD = (푏max−푏min)푏rated = SoCmax − SoCmin. Based on thedegradation model proposed in [17], the number of cycles of
operation could be controlled by increasing SoCmin and/orby decreasing SoCmax. The control of cycles of operationusing friction coefficient is introduced in [13].
We would like to highlight that similar to prior works
[13, 17] for mid-peak period under contract C3, the optimal
action is to do nothing (i.e. stay idle with 훿∗mid-peak = 0).
Note that the proposed ramp rate thresholds presented also
minimized the stress on the battery; stress as defined earlier
on the battery is proportional to the square of the ramp rate
[25, 8].
4.3. Compensation Strategy for Reactive Power
The unique attribute of contracts in Uruguay is themech-
anism used for billing reactive power. The utility have two
thresholds for charging for reactive power. First we list the
penalty
∙ For PF ∈ [0.92, 1]: Consumes pay no penalty under con-
tract C1,
∙ For PF ∈ [0.82, 0.92]: Consumes pay penalty under con-
tract C1, C2 and C3,
∙ For PF ∈ [0, 0.82]: Consumes pay higher penalty com-
pared to case where PF ∈ [0.82, 0.92] under contract C1, C2
and C3,
Consumers could reduce there cost of consumption by
maintaining a high PF for contracts C2 and C3:
∙Maintaining a PF above 0.92 could provide additional gains
to consumers opting for C2 and C3. However, consumers
under C1 hold no incentive in improving the PF beyond 0.92.
∙ Improving PF which under nominal case is lower than 0.92
would reduce the cost of consumption under all contracts.
Next we describe the control mechanism for improving
power factor or in other words reactive power compensation
using energy storage.
4.3.1. Reactive Power Compensation using Energy
Storage interfaced via a Converter
Authors in [16] present that reactive compensation us-
ing energy storage interfaced via a converter performing ar-
bitrage is largely decoupled. This is due to reactive power
capability is governed by converter size and instantaneous
active power. However, if the converter is slightly over-sized
then converter could supply reactive power without being
constrained primarily by instantaneous active power. Fur-
thermore, since the converter size is static and a non-varying
parameter therefore, lookahead in time is not required. This
implies myopic reactive power compensation matches in op-
timal solution. Authors in [16] show through numerical re-
sults that no lookahead reactive power compensation along
with arbitrage (which requires lookahead)matches very closely
with the co-optimization results where the storage performs
arbitrage and PF compensation. The former optimization
problem is denoted as 푃푟ℎ and the later optimization problemis denoted as 푃푝푙푡 in [16]. Based on these findings in priorwork, we propose myopic reactive power compensation for
all contracts. For users opting for C1, must not correct the
PF beyond 0.92.
5. Control Algorithm for Energy Storage for
LV Consumers in Uruguay
In previous sectionswe discussed the new contracts avail-
able for LV consumers in Uruguay and what roles energy
storage could play for such consumers. In this section we
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present the storage control algorithm for the different con-
tracts in Uruguay. The storage control algorithm consists of
two algorithms: UruguayStorageControl and CalculateKfac.
These algorithms could be used for contracts C1, C2 or
C3. The consumer needs to specify storage parameters, con-
verter size, initial battery capacity. The code updates the
storage control decision based on battery capacity available
until the end of month is reached. At the end of month the
algorithm calculates the profit due to storage integration for
the consumer compared to the nominal case where no stor-
age is considered.
5.1. Storage Operation Immune to Uncertainty
Uncertainty in Active Power Control in Uruguay: Con-
trol of energy storage is coupled in time. For the active
power, if the battery is charged in the present time then the
amount of energy available in subsequent time instant will
be higher. Authors in [9] identify that storage performing
only active power arbitrage have uncertainty due to two pa-
rameters: (a.) uncertainty due to electricity price variation
and (b.) uncertainty due net load without storage variation.
These sources of uncertainty was for the case of real-time
electricity price and where the selling price have an arbi-
trary ratio varying between 0 and 1 with respect to the buy-
ing price [9], refer to Case 4 in Figure 1. However, for the
case of Uruguay, the LV consumers respond to Time-of-Use
prices which vary in a deterministic manner, thus no uncer-
tainty due to electricity price variations.
Prior work on energy arbitrage [10] have identified that
energy storage control under equal instantaneous buy and
sell price becomes independent of the net load without stor-
age. This implies that active power control faces no uncer-
tainty with respect to contracts in Uruguay which have ToU
pricing structure and NEM which provides equal buy and
sell price at each time instant. Refer to Appendix A and Fig-
ure 1 for details.
Uncertainty in Reactive Power Control in Uruguay: It
is made clear in Section 4.3.1 that storage interfaced via a
converter operating with no lookahead reaches close to opti-
mality. Furthermore, we show in numerical results that val-
uation of reactive power compensation is significantly lower
than incentive in performing arbitrage. Therefore, in the al-
gorithm presented for active and reactive energy compensa-
tion, the active power is adjusted tomaximize arbitrage gains
and the available energy storage converter is utilized for re-
active power compensation, thus prioritizing active power
over reactive power compensation.
6. Numerical Experiments
The numerical results presents three scenarios. In Sec-
tion 6.1 the potential of performing energy arbitrage is iden-
tified based on gains made by performing arbitrage for a
month. In Section 6.2 consumer cost of consumption is com-
pared with nominal case with storage to that of consumer
load with energy storage performing active and/or reactive
energy compensation. Based on 2 standard models of Tesla
PowerWall we recommend the suitable contracts. A similar
Table 9
Arbitrage Gains Potential for a month
푏rated kWh Contract C2 Contract C3
1 106.68 147.32
2 213.36 294.65
5 533.40 736.62
10 1066.81 1473.23
20 2133.62 2946.46
Table 10
Nominal load of a LV consumer
Load Consumed during kWh
Peak Period 200
Mid Peak 200
Off-peak 100
analysis would be required with consumer of different con-
sumption pattern. In Section 6.3 we present that based on
storage operational cycles and degradation, the battery under
certain contracts and size could be profitable for consumers.
We observe the financial returns of storage in Uruguay are
significantly higher than many ISOs in the USA and Europe
[10].
6.1. Arbitrage Potential
In Table 9 we list the arbitrage gains the storage own-
ers would make for SoCmax = 0.98, SoCmin = 0.2, 휂dis=휂ch=0.95. From Table 9 it is clear that storage is hugely prof-
itable. Storage owner would make 3.56 peso per day per
kWh for contract C2 and 4.91 peso per day per kWh for con-
tract C3. For a user with a 1000 peso per month as elec-
tricity bill under C3 would have to pay nothing perpetually
if they install a 7kWh battery (performing arbitrage only)
which could charge completely within the off-peak time pe-
riod and discharge completely during peak periods.
6.2. Consumer gains with/without storage
For this numerical experiment we assume a consumer
with active energy consumed over a month listed in the table
10. We assume the cumulative absolute value of reactive
power is 퐸푟푄1 = 1.2 × 퐸푟 and cumulative value of absoluteof active power 퐸푎+ = 퐸푎. For the consumer load listedin Table 10 we vary the amount of reactive load and see the
effect without andwith inclusion of energy storage providing
active and/or reactive energy compensation.
6.2.1. Nominal Case
The nominal case consists of inelastic load with DG out-
put in absence of energy storage. Thus the nominal case is
described for no compensation of active and reactive energy
at consumer end. It is essential to analyze the effect on con-
sumer load listed in Table 10 on the cost of consumption
based on the different contracts. Note the presented analy-
sis will vary with consumer load and authors wish to present
the mechanism of analysis for the case described, of course
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Algorithm 1 UruguayStorageControl
Global Inputs: Battery Characteristics: 휂ch, 휂dis, 훿max, 훿min, 푏max, 푏min.
Inputs: Sampling time ℎ, Number of points in a month푁month, Time instant index 푖 = 0,
Function: Computes optimal Active and Reactive Power of Energy Storage Output for Contracts C1, C2 and C3
1: Initialize 푏0, and Input electricity prices 휆peak, 휆mid-peak, 휆off-peak,
2: Input periods of peak, mid-peak and off-peak as 푇peak, 푇mid-peak, 푇off-peak,
3: Set 퐸peak푎 , 퐸mid-peak푎 , 퐸off-peak푎 , 퐸peak푎+ , 퐸mid-peak푎+ , 퐸off-peak푎+ = 0, Set 퐸푟, 퐸푟푄1 = 0,
4: Input the converter rating 푆max퐵 , 푏0
5: while 푖 < 푁month do
6: 푖 = 푖 + 1,
7: if Contract is C1 then Storage can only be used for increasing self-consumption as no Arbitrage possible
8: if Net load without solar 푧푖 ≥ 0 then Battery should discharge s.t. 푥∗푖 = max{−푧푖∕휂푑푖푠, 훿minℎ, (푏푖−1 − 푏max)},
9: else Battery should charge such that 푥∗푖 = min
{
−푧푖휂푐ℎ, 훿maxℎ, 푏푖−1 − 푏min
}.
10: end if
11: else if Contract is C2 or C3 then
12: if 푝푖푒푙푒푐 == 휆peak then Battery should discharge, 푥∗푖 = ℎmax
(
(푏min − 푏max)∕푇peak, (푏min − 푏0)∕ℎ, 훿min
)
,
13: else if 푝푖푒푙푒푐 == 휆mid-peak then Battery should do nothing, 푥∗푖 = 0,
14: else if 푝푖푒푙푒푐 == 휆off-peak then Battery should charge, 푥∗푖 = ℎmin
(
(푏max − 푏min)∕푇off-peak, (푏max − 푏0)∕ℎ, 훿max
)
,
15: end if
16: end if
17: 푠∗푖 = [푥∗푖 ]+∕휂푐ℎ − [푥∗푖 ]−휂푑푖푠 and Set 푃 푖퐵 = 푠푖푔푛(푠∗푖 ) × min
(|푠∗푖 |, 푆max퐵 ),
18: if Contract is C2 and C3 then Set 푄푖퐵 = −푠푖푔푛(푄푖) × min
(|푄푖|, √(푆max퐵 )2 − (푠∗푖 )2),
19: else Select 푄푖퐵 such that power factor is no more then 0.92, as C1 consumers have no additional incentive20: end if
21: if 푝푖푒푙푒푐 == 휆peak then Calculate 퐸peak푎 = 퐸peak푎 + (푃 푖 + 푃 푖퐵)ℎ, and calculate (퐸peak푎 )nominal = (퐸peak푎 )nominal + (푃 푖)ℎ,
22: else if 푝푖푒푙푒푐 == 휆mid-peak then Calculate퐸mid-peak푎 = 퐸mid-peak푎 +(푃 푖+푃 푖퐵)ℎ, and calculate (퐸mid-peak푎 )nominal = (퐸mid-peak푎 )nominal+(푃 푖)ℎ,
23: else if 푝푖푒푙푒푐 == 휆off-peak then Calculate퐸off-peak푎 = 퐸off-peak푎 + (푃 푖 + 푃 푖퐵)ℎ, and calculate (퐸off-peak푎 )nominal = (퐸off-peak푎 )nominal + (푃 푖)ℎ,24: end if
25: Aggregate reactive power, 퐸푟 = 퐸푟 + (푄푖 +푄푖퐵)ℎ,26: Aggregate reactive power in Quadrant 1, 퐸푟푄1 = 퐸푟푄1 + |(푄푖 +푄푖퐵)ℎ|,
27: 푏∗푖 = 푏0 + 푥∗푖 and Update 푏0 = 푏∗푖 ,
28: end while
29: if Contract is C1 then
30: Calculate (퐾fac)nominal with C1 contract using CalculateKfac defined as Algorithm 2,
31: Calculate 퐾fac with C1 contract using CalculateKfac,
32: Nominal Cost =
(
휆fixed + (퐾fac)nominal
)
(퐸푎)nominal,
33: New Cost =
(
휆fixed +퐾fac
)
퐸푎,
34: else if Contract is C2 then
35: Calculate (퐾fac)nominal with C2 contract using CalculateKfac defined as Algorithm 2,
36: Calculate 퐾fac with C2 contract using CalculateKfac,
37: Nominal Cost =
(
휆peak + (퐾fac)nominal
)
(퐸peak푎 )nominal + 휆off-peak
(
(퐸mid-peak푎 )nominal + (퐸
off-peak
푎 )nominal
)
,
38: New Cost =
(
휆peak +퐾fac
)
퐸peak푎 + 휆off-peak
(
퐸mid-peak푎 + 퐸
off-peak
푎
)
,
39: else if Contract is C3 then
40: Calculate 퐸peak푎+ = |퐸peak푎 |, 퐸mid-peak푎+ = |퐸mid-peak푎 |, 퐸off-peak푎+ = |퐸off-peak푎 |,
41: Calculate (퐾fac)nominal with C3 contract using CalculateKfac,
42: Calculate 퐾fac with C3 contract using CalculateKfac,
43: Nominal Cost = 휆peak(퐸peak푎 )nominal + 휆mid-peak(퐸mid-peak푎 )nominal + 휆off-peak(퐸off-peak푎 )nominal + (퐾fac)nominal(퐸peak푎+ )nominal,
44: New Cost = 휆peak퐸peak푎 + 휆mid-peak퐸mid-peak푎 + 휆off-peak퐸off-peak푎 +퐾fac퐸peak푎+ ,
45: end if
46: Profit = Nominal Cost of Consumption − New Cost of Consumption with inclusion Storage,
47: Return Vectors 푥∗, 푄퐵 and Profit.
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Algorithm 2 CalculateKfac
Inputs: 퐸peak푎 , 퐸mid-peak푎 , 퐸off-peak푎 , (퐸peak푎 )nominal, (퐸mid-peak푎 )nominal, (퐸off-peak푎 )nominal, 퐸푟, 퐸푟푄1
Function: Computes 퐾fac for Contracts C1, C2 and C3 for Uruguay LV consumers
1: Initialize 퐴,퐵,
2: if Contract is C1 then
3: Calculate 퐸푎 = 퐸peak푎 + 퐸mid-peak푎 + 퐸off-peak푎 ,
4: Calculate (퐸푎) = (퐸peak푎 )nominal + (퐸mid-peak푎 )nominal + (퐸off-peak푎 )nominal,
5: if 퐸푟∕퐸푎 ≤ 0.426 then
6: Assign 퐾fac = 0,
7: else if 0.426 < 퐸푟∕퐸푎 ≤ 0.7 then
8: Assign 퐾fac = 0.4
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
− 0.426
)
,
9: else
10: Assign 퐾fac = 0.4
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
− 0.426
)
+ 0.6
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
− 0.7
)
,
11: end if
12: if (퐸푟)nominal∕(퐸푎)nominal ≤ 0.426 then
13: Assign (퐾fac)nominal = 0,
14: else if 0.426 < (퐸푟)nominal∕(퐸푎)nominal ≤ 0.7 then
15: Assign (퐾fac)nominal = 0.4
(
(퐸푟)nominal
(퐸푎)nominal
− 0.426
)
,
16: else
17: Assign (퐾fac)nominal = 0.4
(
(퐸푟)nominal
(퐸푎)nominal
− 0.426
)
+ 0.6
(
(퐸푟)nominal
(퐸푎)nominal
− 0.7
)
,
18: end if
19: else if Contract is C2 then
20: Calculate 퐸푎 = 퐸peak푎 + 퐸mid-peak푎 + 퐸off-peak푎 ,
21: Calculate (퐸푎)nominal = (퐸peak푎 )nominal + (퐸mid-peak푎 )nominal + (퐸off-peak푎 )nominal,
22: if 퐸푟∕퐸푎 ≤ 0.7 then
23: Assign 퐾fac = 퐵100
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
− 0.426
)
,
24: else
25: Assign 퐾fac = 퐵100
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
− 0.426
)
+ 100−퐵
100
(
퐸푟
퐸푎
− 0.7
)
,
26: end if
27: if (퐸푟)nominal∕(퐸푎)nominal ≤ 0.7 then
28: Assign (퐾fac)nominal = 퐵100
(
(퐸푟)nominal
(퐸푎)nominal
− 0.426
)
,
29: else
30: Assign (퐾fac)nominal = 퐵100
(
(퐸푟)nominal
(퐸푎)nominal
− 0.426
)
+ 100−퐵
100
(
(퐸푟)nominal
(퐸푎)nominal
− 0.7
)
,
31: end if
32: else if Contract is C3 then
33: Calculate 퐸peak푎+ = |퐸peak푎 |, 퐸mid-peak푎+ = |퐸mid-peak푎 |, 퐸off-peak푎+ = |퐸off-peak푎 |,
34: Calculate 퐸푎+ = 퐸peak푎+ + 퐸mid-peak푎+ + 퐸off-peak푎+ ,
35: Calculate (퐸푎+)nominal = (퐸peak푎+ )nominal + (퐸mid-peak푎+ )nominal + (퐸off-peak푎+ )nominal,
36: if 퐸푟푄1∕퐸푎 ≤ 0.7 then
37: Assign 퐾fac = 퐴100
(
퐸푟푄1
퐸푎+
− 0.426
)
,
38: else
39: Assign 퐾fac = 퐴100
(
퐸푟푄1
퐸푎
− 0.426
)
+ 100−퐴
100
(
퐸푟푄1
퐸푎+
− 0.7
)
,
40: end if
41: if (퐸푟푄1)nominal∕(퐸푎+)nominal ≤ 0.7 then
42: Assign (퐾fac)nominal = 퐴100
(
(퐸푟푄1)nominal
(퐸푎+)nominal
− 0.426
)
,
43: else
44: Assign (퐾fac)nominal = 퐴100
(
(퐸푟푄1)nominal
(퐸푎+)nominal
− 0.426
)
+ 100−퐴
100
(
(퐸푟푄1)nominal
(퐸푎+)nominal
− 0.7
)
,
45: end if
46: end if
47: Return (퐾fac)nominal, 퐾fac.
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Figure 9: Active energy cost with different contracts
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Figure 10: Reactive energy cost with different contracts
a similar analysis needs to be performed for a specific user
who wish to select the appropriate contract based on their
consumption behavior.
Fig. 9 presents the the cost of active energy with increas-
ing share of reactive energy. It is clear that cost of active
energy is independent of increase in reactive energy. In ab-
sence of flexibility to alter the active energy consumption,
clearly contract C1 is best suited for the consumer presented
in Table 10. Fig. 10 presents the cost of reactive energy un-
der contract C1, C2 and C3. With increase in share of reac-
tive energy, cost paid by consumer under C1 is significantly
higher compared to C2 and C3.
Fig. 11 plots the variable cost component denoted as퐶퐶푖variable.It is clear that the cost of active power dominates the variable
cost. The same trends are visible in Fig. 13 which presents
the total cost of consumption which includes the variable
cost, fixed cost and power cost. Note that the fixed cost for
C2 and C3 is almost double the cost paid by consumer under
C1. Fig. 12 presents the ratio of the cost of reactive energy
and the cost of active energy in percentage. For consumers
consuming equal quantities active and reactive energy end
up paying almost 8% of active energy cost under C1, less
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Figure 11: Variable cost with different contracts
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Figure 12: Cost of reactive energy compared to active energy
cost with different contracts
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Figure 13: Total energy cost with different contracts
than 4% of active energy cost under C2 and less than 3%
of active energy cost under C3. Clearly, the value of reac-
tive energy compensation is highest under contract C1. We
would like to bring to notice that the cost paid by consumer
for active energy is significantly higher than that of the re-
active energy. In the proposed algorithm the energy stor-
age converter active power output is selected based on max-
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Figure 14: Cost of active energy with arbitrage
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Figure 15: Total cost with only arbitrage
imization of arbitrage gains and remaining converter capac-
ity is used for supplying reactive power for correcting the PF
in accordance to the contract selected by the LV consumer.
6.2.2. Inclusion of Tesla PowerWall 1 (6.4 kWh)
The total arbitrage gainsmade by consumer owning Tesla
PowerWall 1which has a rated capacity of 6.4 kWh is 682.4733
pesos under contract C2 and 942.5827 pesos under contract
C3. Fig. 14 presents the cost of active energy with inclusion
of energy storage performing only arbitrage. Now we can
see that inclusion of storage have turned contract C3 most
profitable for the consumer.
Fig. 15 presents the total cost with inclusion of energy
storage performing only arbitrage. In this case, total cost
under C2 and C3 are comparable. Assuming energy stor-
age converter could supply all the reactive energy that the
user consumed, which is fairly reasonable as the utility ag-
gregates reactive power over the month. Fig. 16 presents the
total cost of consumption (includes fixed and power cost)
with energy storage performing arbitrage and reactive power
compensation. Clearly, contract C3 consumer pays the least
and consumer under C1 pays the maximum electricity bill
in this scenario. Fig. 17 shows the percentage of consumer
would make with respect to the nominal case under the same
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Figure 16: Total cost of electricity
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Figure 17: Profit due to inclusion of storage in terms of savings
in percentage
contract. Consumers with C3 would make a profit exceeding
25% by installing Tesla PowerWall 1. Note since consumer
under C1 could perform only reactive power compensation,
it makes a profit only if the ratio of reactive energy and active
energy exceeds 0.426.
6.2.3. Inclusion of Tesla PowerWall 2 (13.5 kWh)
The total arbitrage gainsmade by consumer owning Tesla
PowerWall 2which has a rated capacity of 13.5 kWh is 1439.6
pesos under contract C2 and 1988.3 pesos under contract C3.
Fig. 18 presents the cost of active energy with inclusion
of energy storage performing only arbitrage. Now we can
see that inclusion of storage have turned contract C3 most
profitable for the consumer. Note that the gap between C2
and C3 increases as the storage size increases, as the amount
of profit under C3 is higher for performing arbitrage com-
pared to C2. Compare Fig. 14 and Fig. 18.
Fig. 19 presents the total cost with inclusion of energy
storage performing only arbitrage. In this case, total cost
under C2 and C3 are not comparable. Consumer would pay
around 150 pesos lower under C3 then under C2.
Fig. 20 presents the total cost of consumption (includes
fixed and power cost) with energy storage performing arbi-
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Figure 18: Active energy cost with arbitrage for PowerWall 2
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Figure 19: Total cost with only arbitrage for PowerWall 2
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Figure 20: Total cost of electricity for Tesla PowerWall 2
trage and reactive power compensation. Clearly, contract C3
consumer pays the least and consumer under C1 pays the
maximum electricity bill in this scenario with Tesla Power-
Wall 2. Fig. 21 shows the percentage of consumer would
make with respect to the nominal case under the same con-
tract. Consumers with C3 would make a profit exceeding
50% by installing Tesla PowerWall 2. Consumers with C2
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Figure 21: Profit due to inclusion of storage in terms of savings
in percentage for Tesla PowerWall 2
would make a profit exceeding 40% by installing Tesla Pow-
erWall 2. Note since consumer under C1 could perform only
reactive power compensation, it makes a profit only if the ra-
tio of reactive energy and active energy exceeds 0.426.
We observe that consumers with storage should opt for
C3, i.e., three level time-of-use electricity pricing rather than
fixed pricing under C1. Note that the selection of contract
also depends on the reactive energy consumed, load and stor-
age size. In this analysis we assume that conditions 푇off-peak >
푇ch and 푇peak > 푇dis are true.
6.3. Energy Storage Profitability
The cost of Tesla Powerwall 1 is $3000 and Tesla Pow-
erwall 2 is $5500, making the per kWh cost of $470 and
$398 [32]. Consider the storage could perform 3000 cycles
of 100% depth-of-discharge over a maximum calendar life of
10 years. We use the degradation model presented in [17].
In order to have the storage application profitable the per cy-
cle gains should satisfy
∙ For Tesla Powerwall 1: the battery should earn more than
$1 for each cycle in order to be profitable,
∙ For Tesla Powerwall 2: the battery should earn more than
$1.8333 for each cycle in order to be profitable.
The depth-of-discharge of battery for each day is equiv-
alent to DoDdaily = SoCmax − SoCmin. Thus, the batteryperforms 0.7608 cycles of 100% DoD each day and 277.7
cycles each day.
Of course the storage gains are dependent on the load ac-
tive and reactive energy consumed during different times of
the day. For the nominal load profile storage gains by only
performing arbitrage appears to be profitable as the dollar
per cycle gain exceeds the dollars per cycle cost calculated
based on the cost and life ratings of the battery. Adding the
reactive compensation gains would further improve the dol-
lars per cycle of the battery, in effect reducing the payback
period. The simple payback period for cases where storage
is profitable would lie between 3-4 years, similar to storage
returns in the island of Madeira [20].
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Table 11
Profitability
Parameter Tesla Powerwall 1 Tesla Powerwall 2
Desired $/cycle $1.0 $1.833
Month gain in pesos C2: 682.5, C3:942.6 C2: 1439.6, C3:1988.3
Month gain in dollars C2: 20.29, C3:28.02 C2: 42.8, C3:59.11
Total cycles in month 22.83 22.83
Gain in $/cycle C2: 0.889, C3: 1.227 C2: 1.874, C3: 2.589
7. Conclusion
The details of electricity billing and net-metering policy
under the new electricity consumer contracts applicable to
the low voltage electricity consumers in Uruguay are sum-
marized. The consumer contracts make it attractive for con-
sumers to install energy storage and distributed generation.
Due to the huge difference between peak and off-peak elec-
tricity pricing, installing energy storage could be reward-
ing for LV consumers. Furthermore, consumers could use
the storage converter for reactive power compensation which
could provide an additional revenue stream for the consumer.
For each contract threshold-based uncertainty insensitive al-
gorithm based on hierarchical control of active energy for
arbitrage and reactive energy compensation is proposed. In
the present work, the question of whether energy storage is
profitable for three new energy contracts in Uruguay is as-
sessed. These contracts are of particular interest for two rea-
sons. Firstly, the buying price and selling price are the same,
for which it is shown that policy for performing arbitrage is
insensitive to load and generation. Secondly, reactive power
compensation is monetarily compensated in some of those
cases. With data from real batteries and taking into account
battery degradation, it is shown that for some of the new
contracts it will be profitable to buy a battery, while for oth-
ers it will not. For the latter case, an evaluation of the best
contract available is also provided. Using numerical results
we show that arbitrage is more profitable that reactive en-
ergy compensation, but prior work [16] identifies that reac-
tive compensation can still be performed without compro-
mising the former. Energy markets with similar pricing and
net-metering policy could use this analysis.
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A. Arbitrage with Net-Energy Metering with
Sell Price equal to Retail Rate
Energy arbitrage refers to buying energy when the price
of electricity is low and selling it when price is high. An-
other interpretation could be shifting consumption from high
price periods to low price periods. The problem of energy
arbitrage is considered from consumer or end-user perspec-
tive. The consumer of electricity has its goal to minimize the
overall cost of consumption by installing energy storage de-
vice such as a battery for performing energy arbitrage. The
price of electricity is denoted as 푝푒푙푒푐(푖). The consumer op-timization problem is given as [10]
(푃 0푎푟푏푖푡푟푎푔푒) min
푃 푖퐵∈
[
휂dis훿minℎ,
훿maxℎ
휂ch
] 푁∑
푖=1
[푃푖 + 푃 푖퐵]푝푒푙푒푐(푖)
subject to,(i.) 푏min − 푏0 ≤
푖∑
푗=1
푥푗 ≤ 푏max − 푏0.
The optimization problem (푃 0푎푟푏푖푡푟푎푔푒) is equivalent to min∑푁
푖=1{푝푒푙푒푐(푖)푃푖 + 푝푒푙푒푐(푖)푃
푖
퐵}. Since there is no degree of
freedom in 푝푒푙푒푐(푖)푃푖 for all 푖, therefore, (푃 0푎푟푏푖푡푟푎푔푒) is equiv-alent to
(푃 푒푞푢푖푎푟푏푖푡푟푎푔푒) min
푃 푖퐵∈
[
휂dis훿minℎ,
훿maxℎ
휂ch
] 푁∑
푖=1
푃 푖퐵푝푒푙푒푐(푖)
s.t. (i.) 푏min − 푏0 ≤
푖∑
푗=1
푥푗 ≤ 푏max − 푏0,∀푖 ∈ {1, .., 푁}
B. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Let 휖 denote a sufficiently small amount of energy,
and w.l.o.g assume that inside every time slot, all energy
packets arrive sequentially. We define퐸={휖1, 휖2, .., 휖퐾} as acomplete order of all energy packets that charged the battery.
Let 퐼푘 denote the time slot at which the packet 휖푘 entered thebattery and 푂푘 when it left it. If the packet never left (thatis, if there is remaining energy in the battery at the end of
the arbitrage) we let 푘 = ∞ and 푝∞푠 = 0. Let 푛푖푗 denote thenumber of packets that charged the battery during time slot
푖 and discharged at time slot 푗.
푛푖푗 =
퐾∑
푘=0
핀{퐼푘 = 푖, 푂푘 = 푗}
The price of charging the battery 휖 at time 푖 is given by 휖 푝푖푏휂푐ℎ .The earnings of discharging the battery at time slot 푗 is given
by 휖휂푑푖푠푝푗푠. Finally, the total profit obtained by the arbitrageis given by:
Profit = ∑
푖∈[푁],푗∈[푁]∖{1}∪{∞}
휖푛푖푗
[
휂푑푖푠푝
푗
푠 −
푝푖푏
휂푐ℎ
]
Because 푚푖푗 ∈ ℕ, if 푝푗푠휂푑푖푠 ≤ 푝푖푏휂푐ℎ , then 푃푟표푓푖푡 ≤ 0.
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Figure 22: The size of the squares represents the amount of
energy. Red squares (before been charged in the battery) are
bigger than the squares composing the battery. This in turn,
are bigger than the green squares that output the battery. Re-
garding the case presented: initially, the battery is empty. At
푡 = 1, 2 energy packets arrive 휖1 and 휖2, so 퐼1 = 퐼2 = 1. In
the next timeslot, 휖2 leaves so we can update 푂2 = 2. At
timeslot 푡 = 3, three energy packets arrive (3,4,5) so we have
퐼3 = 퐼4 = 퐼5 = 3. Finally, in the last timeslot the energy pack-
ets 휖1 and 휖4 leave so 푂1 = 푂4 = 4. Because the battery is
still fully charged at the end of the horizon, 푂3 = 푂5 = ∞. In
this example 푛12 = 1, 푛14 = 1, 푛34 = 1 and 푛3∞ = 2. With this
information the final profit can be found.
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